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I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) characteriz-
es itself as "a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 1
Because it is designed to assure "equality of opportunity, full participa-
tion, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency" 2 for the
disabled, the ADA is that group's "long-awaited equivalent to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964."'
The ADA provides "clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties."4  Moreover, in an attempt to assure maximum fairness in its
application, the ADA's drafters delegated to the courts the responsibili-
ty for conducting fact-specific, individualized inquiries. However, in
the context of disabled employees with high absenteeism, courts have
fashioned a sweeping, unnecessary, and misleading rule of law in
contravention of the case-by-case approach mandated by the ADA.
This ill-conceived blanket rule requires, as a matter of law, a person's"presence" as an essential function of most, if not all jobs. Thus,
courts have effectively eliminated ADA protection for an entire class
of disabled individuals-those suffering from chronic illnesses.
Most disabled individuals with high absenteeism suffer from so-
called "invisible chronic illnesses"--diseases that are characterized by
' B.A., magna cum laude, 1992, California State University, Dominguez Hills; J.D. Candidate
1996, Seattle University School of Law. Note & Comment Editor, Seattle University Law
Review. The author would like to thank Professor Melinda Branscomb of Seattle University
School of Law for her helpful comments.
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(1) (West 1994).
2. Id. § 12101(a)(8).
3. Rosalie K. Murphy, Reasonable Accommodation and Employment Discrimination Under Title
I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1607, 1608 (1991).
4. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(2) (West 1994).
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their chronicity and non-externally manifested symptomatology.5
Examples of these "invisible chronic illnesses" include chronic fatigue
syndrome, irritable bowel syndrome, HIV infection, multiple sclerosis,
endometriosis, Crohn's disease, fibromyalgia, and lupus erythemato-
sus.' These illnesses typically involve unpredictable periods of pain
or fatigue or both, interspersed with periods of remission, resulting in
the continued disruption of the work and the lives of their victims.
Anyone suffering from an "invisible chronic illness" is in a particularly
tenuous position when it comes to employment.7 Often these victims
are afraid to tell their employers of their conditions for fear of reprisal.
As one sufferer of chronic fatigue syndrome described the situation,
"I'm afraid I can't keep the act up anymore because I'm so exhausted.
But I'm even more afraid if I let them know what I'm going through
it will mean the end of my job."' Eventually, this woman's chronic
fatigue symptoms may force her to miss work frequently. When that
happens, her fears will not be laid to rest if she looks to the ADA for
protection.
In nearly all cases, long-term chronic illnesses satisfy the ADA's
broad definition of disability. However, when these illnesses begin
to cause absenteeism, the "presence is an essential function" rule
effectively denies protection to the victims of these illnesses, as they are
no longer "qualified individuals" under the ADA regardless of whether
they satisfy the technical requirements for a position.
The idea that "presence is an essential function" is a myth because
(1) it erroneously assumes that most jobs can be performed only at the
worksite, and (2) virtually all employers are able to, and do, accommo-
date some degree of employee absenteeism. Thus, this Comment
argues that the "presence is an essential function" rule is unsound.
The courts should discard this rule and, instead, ask the question that
5. PAUL J. DONOGHUE & MARY E. SIEGEL, SICK AND TIRED OF FEELING SICK AND
TIRED-LIVING WITH INVISIBLE CHRONIC ILLNESS 4 (1992).
6. Id. at 6.
7. Although this Comment is concerned with chronic illness, an in-depth analysis of the
problems unique to HIV infection, mental illness, and drug and alcohol addiction is beyond the
scope of this article. For discussions of these issues, see Paul F. Mickey, Jr. & Maryelena Pardo,
Dealing With Mental Disabilities Under the ADA, 9 LAB. LAW. 531 (1993); Loretta K. Haggard,
Note, Reasonable Accommodation of Individuals with Mental Disabilities and Psychoactive Substance
Use Disorders Under Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 343 (1993); Laura Pincus, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Employers' New
Responsibilities to HIV-Positive Employees, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 561 (1993).
8. DONOGHUE & SIEGEL, supra note 5, at 111.
9. See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
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is mandated by the ADA: Can the chronically ill employee be
accommodated?
This approach is appropriate for four reasons: First, the
unnecessarily broad and sweeping language that "presence is an
essential function" is both unnecessary and misleading. Second, the
ADA and its interpretive regulations mandate fact-intensive, case-
specific inquiries in order to satisfy the ADA's goal of making
employment opportunities available to the maximum number of
disabled individuals. Third, it is the disabled individual, not his or her
absenteeism, that must be accommodated. Finally, numerous
reasonable accommodations exist for individuals with disability-related
absenteeism.
Part II of this Comment will describe the legislative history and
provisions of Title I of the ADA. It will also trace the evolution of the"qualified individual" and the duty to accommodate, as well as the
emergence of the "presence is an essential function" myth. Part III
will describe how the courts' invention and continued application of
the "presence is an essential function" myth is contrary to the purposes
of the ADA. Finally, Part IV will offer an appropriate approach to
analyzing cases involving disability-related absenteeism.
II. TITLE I OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
A. Legislative History and Purpose
Congress enacted Title I of the ADA in response to the discrimi-
nation that persons with disabilities encountered in the workplace.
The legislators recognized that the history of isolation and discrimina-
tion faced by disabled individuals continued to pervade American
society, particularly private employment. They determined that people
with disabilities, as a group, suffered reduced socioeconomic status.
Further, they concluded that discrimination denied the disabled the
opportunity to compete equally with others, and cost both the
government and the private sector "billions of dollars in unnecessary
expenses resulting from dependency and non-productivity."' 10
Before the ADA was enacted, the employment picture for people
with disabilities was dismal. Two-thirds of all disabled Americans
between ages 16 and 64 were not working at all, although two thirds
10. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 28-29 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 310.
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of those wanted to have a job." Despite enactment of legislation such
as the Rehabilitation Act,12 both employment and income levels
among the disabled actually dropped between 1980 and 1988.'3 The
majority of unemployed disabled individuals, an estimated 8.2 million
people, were relying on insurance payments or government payments
to support themselves. 4 The House of Representatives, in 1990,
recognized the demoralization felt by disabled individuals when they
are denied the ability to be self-supporting." As one disabled woman
put it, "[W]e can go just so long constantly reaching dead ends. I am
broke, degraded, and angry .... [W]hich way and where can we go?
What and who can we be?" 6
Inherent in the ADA legislation is the acknowledgment that
disabled persons represent an untapped resource. "Millions of disabled
Americans who have been denied access to the workplace are well
educated and can be easily trained. What is more, they are some of
the most highly motivated people in our society today."' 7 According-
ly, a rule that precludes the chronically ill from the protection of the
ADA is clearly antithetical to the purposes of the legislation.
B. Provisions of Title I
Title I of the ADA prohibits discriminatory employment practices
against a "qualified individual with a disability" because of that
individual's disability.'" Covered entities"9 may not discriminate
against qualified individuals because of their disabilities in job
application procedures; hiring, advancement, or discharge actions;
employee compensation; job training; nor in other terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment.20 Discriminatory actions prohibited by
the ADA include failing to make reasonable accommodations to the
11. Id. at 32 (citing LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, THE ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED
AMERICANS: BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM 50 (1986)), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314.
12. 29 U.S.C.A. § 701-797 (West 1994).
13. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 32 (1990) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, LABOR FORCE STATUS AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS
OF PERSONS WITH WORK DISABILITIES, 1981-1988. CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES P-23, No. 160, Table C, 4), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314.
14. Id. at 33, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 43, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 325.
17. Id. at 45, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 327.
18. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West 1994).
19. A "covered entity" is a private employer employing more than 15 employees. Id.
§ 12111(5)(A).
20. Id. § 12112(a).
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known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless the
covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship on the operation of its business. 1 The ADA also
prohibits "utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration
that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability."22
Thus, the ADA plaintiff states a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion by showing that he or she is a "qualified individual with a
disability," that is, "an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
21. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The following is a complete list of discriminatory actions
prohibited by the ADA:
(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that
adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of
the disability of such applicant or employee;
(2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the
effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability
to the discrimination prohibited by this title (such relationship includes a relationship
with an employment or referral agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe
benefits to an employee of the covered entity, or an organization providing training and
apprenticeship programs;
(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration-
(A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or
(B) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common
administrative control;
(4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual
because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is
known to have a relationship or association;
(5) (A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or
employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of
such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental
impairments of the employee or applicant;
(6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that
screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals
with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the
covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent
with business necessity; and
(7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in the most
effective manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to a job applicant or
employee who has a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test
results accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant
or employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the impaired
sensory, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such
skills are the factors that the test purports to measure).
Id. § 12112(b).
22. Id. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
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of the employment position that such individual holds or desires."23
Once these elements are shown, the burden shifts to the employer to
show that the suggested accommodation would impose an undue
hardship.24
1. Disability
The plaintiffs first step, then, is to show that he or she is "an
individual with a disability." An "individual with a disability" is one
who (1) has a physical or mental impairment 5 that substantially
limits one or more of the individual's "major life activities," (2) has a
record of such impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an
impairment.26
"Major life activities" are "functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, [or] working. '"27 An individual's ability to work is substan-
tially limited if his or her ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs of various classes is significantly restricted when
compared with the ability of an average person who has comparable
qualifications. 28 Thus, even if a physical or mental impairment limits
an individual only in his or her ability to work, the individual satisfies
the statutory definition of "an individual with a disability. 29
For several reasons, victims of chronic, long-term illness almost
always satisfy the statutory definition of "individual with a disability."
First, most chronic illnesses are characterized by intermittent periods
of acute symptoms that severely impair the individual's ability to
function. Second, most chronic illnesses, while often treatable to
reduce the severity of symptoms, are usually incurable. Finally, during
the debilitating episodes that are characteristic of chronic illness, the
victim is often unable to work at all, or can work only for short periods
23. Id. § 12111(8).
24. The shifting burdens of persuasion of an ADA case are modeled after those of Title VII.
Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 308 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd, 956 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1992).
25. A physical or mental impairment is
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal,
special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2) Any mental
or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional
or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1994).
26. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West 1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1994).
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1994) (emphasis added).
28. Id. pt. 1630 app.
29. Id.
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of time. Thus, there appears to be little debate over whether or not
victims of chronic illnesses are disabled: In virtually every case
discussed in this Comment, the plaintiffs easily satisfied the definition
of "individual with a disability."
2. Essential Functions
Next, the plaintiff must show that he or she can perform the"essential functions" of the employment position, with or without
reasonable accommodation. Essential functions are not defined in the
statute. However, the EEOC regulations define essential functions as"the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual
with a disability holds."3" A job function may be considered essential
for any of several reasons. For example, a job function may be
essential because (1) the employment position exists for the perfor-
mance of the function, (2) the number of employees among whom
performance of the function can be distributed is limited, or (3) the
function is highly specialized and the employee was hired for his or her
expertise or ability to perform it.3"
Under the EEOC regulations, the following factors determine
whether a particular function is essential:
(i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii)
Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job
performing the function; (iv) The consequence of not requiring the
incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective
bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents
in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents
in similar jobs.32
By referring to the "performance" of "duties," this statutory
scheme clearly contemplates tasks, not the ethereal concept of"presence." Significantly, these regulations strongly suggest that an
essential function cannot be defined by physical requirements that
disqualify disabled workers from performing it. 3 For example, when
a sack-handler position requires an employee to pick up fifty-pound
sacks and carry them from the company loading dock to the storage
room, an employer cannot say that the essential function of the
position is carrying the sacks. Rather, the employer must say that the
30. Id. § 1630.2(n)(1) (emphasis added).
31. Id. § 1630.2(n)(2).
32. Id. § 1630.2(n)(3).
33. See id. pt. 1630 app. (Section 1630.9 Not Making Reasonable Accommodation).
1995]
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essential function is causing the sack to move from the loading dock to
the storage room because defining the function in terms of human
physiology would effectively disqualify a person with a back problem
from performing the job. Defining the function as causing the sack to
move from one place to another allows for the implementation of any
number of reasonable accommodations, such as the provision of a
dolly, hand truck, or cart. 4
Analogizing the foregoing example to the chronically ill employee
with absenteeism problems, it is unacceptable to say that presence is
an essential function because this defines the job in terms of a physical
requirement. If a person's disability prohibits him or her from
adhering to a regular work schedule, the question should be: What
reasonable accommodation would allow that person to accomplish the
actual job duties?
3. Reasonable Accommodation
As with essential functions, "reasonable accommodation" is not
defined by statute. Instead, the legislation provides examples of
reasonable accommodations, such as "job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, [and] reassignment to a vacant position."'35
According to the EEOC guidelines, reasonable accommodation
includes "modifications ... to the manner or circumstances under
which the position held or desired is customarily performed ... that
enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential
functions of that position."36  However, an accommodation is only
reasonable when it does not impose an undue hardship on the
employer.37
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the employer
is permitted to show that making the necessary accommodations would
impose an undue hardship on its operations. 38
4. Undue Hardship
"Undue hardship" is "an action requiring significant difficulty or
expense" when considered in light of a number of factors. These
factors include, among others, the nature and cost of the accommoda-
34. See id.
35. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(9) (West 1994).
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(ii) (1994).
37. Hence, although the burden of showing undue hardship lies with the employer.
defendant, in actuality the plaintiff implicitly has to show that the suggested accommodations do
not impose undue hardship.
38. Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 308.
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tion, the overall financial resources of the facility, the number of
persons employed at such facility, and other impacts of such accommo-
dation upon the operation of the facility.39 The EEOC guidelines
mirror the statutory language ° but add another factor: "[t]he impact
of the accommodation upon the operation of the facility, including the
impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and
the impact on the facility's ability to conduct business. '41
These factors reflect Congress' desire to balance the interests of
the employer with those of the disabled person who is seeking
accommodation. The undue hardship analysis is the employer's"opportunity to prove that . . . the costs [of an accommodation] are
excessive in relation either to the benefits of the accommodation or to
the employer's financial survival or health."42 Where accommodating
a disabled person would place too onerous a burden on the operations
of an employer, the employer is not legally bound to provide such
accommodation. Notably, however, in nearly all of the disability-
related absenteeism cases, employers rarely, if ever, had to show how
accommodating a plaintiffs illness and its resultant attendance
problems would impose an undue hardship. In most cases, the courts
simply agreed with the employers' argument that presence was an
essential function. Because a plaintiff with attendance problems was
unable to perform this essential function, his or her prima facie case
necessarily failed, and the courts found no need to inquire into any of
the factors comprising undue hardship.
For example, in Tyndall v. National Education Centers, Inc.,"3
Mary Tyndall, a lupus victim, was discharged for excessive absentee-
ism because of her illness. Despite the plaintiff s excellent performance
39. The ADA defines undue hardship as
an action requiring significant difficulty or expense when considered in light of the
[following] factors[:] (i) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this
Act; (ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the
provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such
facility; the effect on expenses or resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommoda-
tion upon the operation of the facility; (iii) the overall financial resources of the covered
entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of
its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (iv) the type of
operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and
functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative,
or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(10) (West 1994).
40. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2) (1994).
41. Id.
42. Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995).
43. 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994).
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evaluations, the court disqualified her from the protection of the ADA
because "an employee who does not come to work cannot perform any
of his job functions, essential or otherwise."" Interestingly, the
employer had accommodated the plaintiffs absences in the past. The
employer did not show why a continuation of this accommodation
would impose on it an undue hardship.
Similarly, in Jackson v. Veterans Administration,4" a temporary
housekeeping aide who suffered from rheumatoid arthritis was not"otherwise qualified" under the Rehabilitation Act46 because he failed
to satisfy the "presence requirement" of the job.47 The court rejected
the aide's suggestions of scheduling a regular day off or delaying the
start of his shift for his treatments.48 According to the majority, the
suggested accommodations did not address the unpredictable nature of
the absences, and this unpredictability precluded any reasonable
accommodation: "Requiring the VA to accommodate such absences
would place upon the agency the burden of making last-minute
provisions for Jackson's work to be done by someone else. Such a
requirement would place an undue hardship on the agency.""
Unfortunately, the court did not support this conclusion with any
evidence.
5. The Case-By-Case Requirement
As the statutory definitions and long lists of factors suggest, courts
should evaluate the elements of an ADA suit on a case-by-case basis.
"This case-by-case approach is essential if qualified individuals of
varying abilities are to receive equal opportunities to compete for an
infinitely diverse range of jobs."' Notwithstanding this case-by-case
requirement, courts continually apply a blanket rule that presence is an
essential function. This rule originated in cases where excessive
disability-related absenteeism occurred, where presence may have been
an arguable prerequisite to the job, and where there probably was no
reasonable accommodation available for the plaintiff.
44. Id. at 213 (citing Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481, 485 (W.D. Tenn. 1986)).
45. 22 F.3d 277 (11th Cir. 1994).
46. The provisions of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are construed similarly. See infra
notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
47. Jackson, 22 F.3d at 279.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (1994) (Background).
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C. The Origin of the "Presence Is An Essential Function" Myth
The first cases holding that presence is an essential function arose
under the Rehabilitation Act before the Supreme Court clarified the
affirmative duty to accommodate in the landmark case of School Board
of Nassau County v. Arline.5' This line of reasoning was followed in
subsequent Rehabilitation Act cases and found its way into ADA cases
because the ADA requires its provisions to be interpreted in a way that"prevents imposition of inconsistent or conflicting standards for the
same requirements" under the two statutes. 52  Therefore, even
modern courts have looked to Rehabilitation Act case law to interpret
provisions of the ADA.3
The "presence is an essential function" line of reasoning first
emerged in Wimbley v. Bolger,54 a pre-Arline Rehabilitation Act case
in which the plaintiff, who suffered from a mental condition, was
discharged for violations of the United States Postal Service's atten-
dance control policy requiring advance notice of absences. Although
the court acknowledged that the plaintiff could perform his job when
he came to work, it found that the plaintiff was not a qualified disabled
employee under the Rehabilitation Act.5 "It is elemental that one
who does not come to work cannot perform any of his job functions,
essential or otherwise." 6  The court did not require the Service to
show why accommodating Mr. Wimbley's absences would impose an
undue hardship. Instead, the court stated that the Service "must have
employees who can be counted on to come to work on a regular
basis."5" Thus, they concluded "it is obvious why the Postal Service
could not simply allow plaintiff to come and go as he pleased." 8
Similarly, in Matzo v. Postmaster General,9 while conceding that
a stenographer's technical skills were satisfactory, the court held that
51. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
52. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12117(b) (West 1994).
53. See Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995);
Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994); Dutton v. Johnson
County Bd. of Comrnm'rs, 859 F. Supp. 498, 504 (D. Kan. 1994); EEOC v. AIC Sec.
Investigation, Ltd., 820 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 (N.D. I11. 1993).
54. 642 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), affd, 831 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1987).
55. Id. at 485. The Rehabilitation Act, as originally enacted, used the terms "handicap" and
"handicapped," whereas the ADA uses the terms "disability" and "disabled." For consistency,
the latter terms are used throughout this Comment.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. 685 F. Supp. 260 (D.D.C. 1987), affd, 861 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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she was not otherwise qualified under the Rehabilitation Act because"a minimal and basic qualification for any job . .. is the ability to
report for work and remain on duty for the duration of the workday.
. .. [A disability] which deprives a worker of an ability to fulfill an
essential requirement of his craft can never be 'otherwise qualified.' 60
The opinion was devoid of any discussion of why suggested accommo-
dations would have imposed undue hardship on the employer.6
Unfortunately, the requirement that courts must follow Rehabilita-
tion Act case law has led some courts to disregard the change in
statutory language from the Rehabilitation Act to the ADA.
D. The Evolution of the "Qualified Individual" from the
Rehabilitation Act to the ADA
Because the ADA originated in the Rehabilitation Act, it is
helpful to compare the language of the two statutes and then examine
Rehabilitation Act case law addressing an employer's duty to accom-
modate.
The provisions of the ADA were derived from the regulations
implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.62 The
Rehabilitation Act, in its original form, provided that an "otherwise
qualified [disabled] individual" should not be excluded from participa-
tion in any program receiving federal financial assistance. 63 Accord-
ing to the Rehabilitation Act's interpretive regulations, an "otherwise
qualified [disabled] individual" was, in the employment context, one
who could perform the essential functions of the job. When this
performance was not possible, the court was to consider whether any
reasonable accommodation by the employer would enable the person
to perform those functions.64 As courts began to interpret these
requirements, confusion arose as to the extent of the employer's duty
to accommodate.
For example, in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,65 the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the Rehabilitation Act required
60. Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
61. See id. at 263-64. Not surprisingly, a similar approach was taken in a subsequent case
decided by the same court. See Lemere v. Burnley, 683 F. Supp. 275 (D.D.C. 1988). In that
case, an alcoholic's two-year pattern of unscheduled absences removed her from the protection
of the Rehabilitation Act. Because her absences prevented her from following a regular work
schedule under which she could "perform the essential functions" of her position, she lost the
status of a "qualified handicapped employee." Id. at 280.
62. 29 U.S.C.A. § 791 (West 1994).
63. Id. § 794.
64. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987).
65. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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institutions to make modifications in their programs to accommodate
disabled persons.66 At the same time, however, the Court defined the
"otherwise qualified" person as "one who is able to meet all of a
program's requirements in spite of his [disability]. '"67 As one com-
mentator noted, "the Court's contradictory language failed to clarify
the duty of accommodation and set the stage for confusion in the lower
courts."68
In 1987, however, the Supreme Court confirmed that employers
have an affirmative duty to accommodate the disabled. In School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline,69 the Court stated that when a
disabled person is not able to perform the essential functions of the
job, the lower court must also consider whether any "reasonable
accommodation" by the employer would enable the disabled person to
perform those functions.7" "Employers have an affirmative obligation
to make a reasonable accommodation for a [disabled] employee"71 and
cannot deny an employee alternative employment opportunities
reasonably available under the employer's existing policies.7" Further,
the district court must conduct an individualized inquiry and make
appropriate findings of fact,73 specifically considering the factors
delineated in the interpretive regulations as to whether such accommo-
dation would impose undue hardship.74 Although this opinion still
left open the question of how much accommodation was enough, it
made clear that equal treatment for the disabled was not all that was
required under the Rehabilitation Act.
In light of the confusion over the Rehabilitation Act's definition
of the "otherwise qualified" disabled individual and the scope of the
employer's duty to accommodate, the ADA's drafters were careful to
insert the reasonable accommodation requirement into the statutory
definition of a "qualified individual with a disability." Under the
ADA, a "qualified individual with a disability" is "an individual with
a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position that such individual
66. Id. at 408.
67. Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
68. Murphy, supra note 3, at 1623.
69. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
70. Id. at 289.
71. Id. at 289 n.19 (emphasis added).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 287.
74. Id. at 287 n.17.
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holds or desires."7  In theory at least, this should have resolved
whatever question might have remained about whether disabled
employees must be accommodated.
Nonetheless, in the context of disability-related absenteeism,
courts have been reluctant to let go of the idea that presence is an
essential function of most jobs, resulting in cursory treatment of the
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship issues. Although it
appears that under the ADA courts have taken a more balanced
approach by acknowledging the duty to accommodate, they continue
to perpetuate the "presence is an essential function" myth. Further,
it is far from clear how cases will be analyzed in the future.76 It is
time to discard this myth altogether so that individuals disabled by
chronic illnesses will know that they are protected by the ADA.
III. HOW AND WHY THE "PRESENCE IS AN ESSENTIAL
FUNCTION" MYTH SUBVERTS THE PURPOSE OF THE ADA
For several reasons, the "presence is an essential function" myth
disserves the purposes of the ADA and the class of people it is
designed to protect. First, the sweeping language used by the courts
is both unnecessary and misleading. Second, the myth allows the court
to avoid the individualized inquiry that is mandated by the ADA by
hindering the plaintiff's ability to state a prima facie case, thus
circumventing the undue hardship analysis. Third, the myth
disregards the fact that it is the person with the disability who must be
accommodated, not the absenteeism that must be accommodated.
Finally, the myth belies the fact that accommodations exist for disabled
employees with attendance problems.
75. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West 1994) (emphasis added). In addition, the Rehabilitation
Act's interpretive regulations now contain nearly identical language. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f)
(1994).
76. See Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995); Barfield
v. Bell S. Telecoms., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Miss. 1995) ("This court recognizes ... that
regular attendance at work is an essential function of virtually all jobs."); Johnson v. Children's
Hosp. of Phila., No. 94-5698, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7743, at *4-5 (E.D. Penn. June 5, 1995)
("[A]bsences caused by a disability do not eliminate the requirement that an employee
demonstrate regular attendance in order to be considered 'qualified' for the position."); Falczynski
v. Amoco Oil Co., 533 N.W.2d 226, 232 (Iowa 1995) (Plaintiff "could not perform the
quintessential function of regularly attending work."). But see Hall v. Janet Wattles Ctr., No. 94-
C-50239, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5801, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 1995) ("[D]etermining whether
an employer's actions constitute discrimination violative of the ADA involves looking both to
whether the person can perform the essential functions of the job and to whether a reasonable
accommodation can be made that would permit the employee to do so."); Carlson v. Inacom
Corp., 885 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Neb. 1995) (requiring employer to present evidence that plaintiff's
absences resulted in essential business not being completed in a timely and efficient manner).
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A. The Courts' Sweeping Language is Unnecessary and Misleading
In most of the cases perpetuating the "presence is an essential
function" line of reasoning, such a sweeping rule was unnecessary to
the result of the case. For example, in Carr v. Reno,7 the court held
that a coding clerk who suffered from an ear condition that caused
periodic dizziness, nausea, and vomiting so that she had to be absent
from work for prolonged periods of time without warning, was not a"qualified individual" under the Rehabilitation Act.78  The coding
clerk was part of a small staff that worked under tight deadlines, and
her absences prevented her from performing her duties within those
deadlines.79 Further, the unpredictable nature of her disability meant
that there was probably no reasonable accommodation available that
would have enabled her to meet the deadlines.80 On these facts, even
under a full analysis of the reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship issues, the plaintiff probably would not have been able to
prevail. However, rather than limiting the case to its own facts, the
court held that regular attendance was an essential function of a coding
clerk position; thus, despite the plaintiffs outstanding performance
rating, she was not qualified for protection under the Rehabilitation
Act.8
Not only was the court's holding unnecessarily broad-in general,
the job of coding clerk seems particularly suited to telecommuting-but
it was misleading. Although the court acknowledged the affirmative
duty to accommodate," it rejected the argument that the district court
should have conducted an "individualized inquiry" into possible forms
of reasonable accommodation; once the district court determined that
the coding clerk could not perform an essential function of the job,
there was no need for further factflnding. As the court put it, "Any
other holding would require a district court to engage in a pro forma
wild goose chase every time a plaintiff invokes the Rehabilitation
Act."83  However, an individualized inquiry is exactly what is
required under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
77. 23 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
78. Id. at 530.
79. Id. at 529.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 528.
83. Id. at 530. Ironically, despite its strong language, a careful reading of the opinion reveals
that the appellate court did conduct an individualized inquiry in this instance. See id. at 529-30.
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Even where courts have acknowledged the need for a reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship inquiry, they have simultaneously
undermined it with unnecessarily broad statements. For example, in
Dutton v. Johnson County Board of County Commissioners,4 a case
involving a heavy equipment operator who suffered from migraine
headaches, the court's inquiry was whether any reasonable accommoda-
tion would allow the plaintiff to perform the essential functions of his
job without creating an undue hardship on the defendant."5 Although
this inquiry would have been sufficient under the ADA, the court
perpetuated the "presence is an essential function" line of reasoning
when it made the irrelevant comment that "regular attendance is no
doubt an essential function of almost every job." 6
B. The "Presence is an Essential Function" Myth
Circumvents the Individualized Inquiry and the
Employer's Obligation to Show Undue Hardship
The individualized approach that is mandated by the ADA is
thwarted when a plaintiff is disqualified because of an inability to
appear at the workplace. Because of the structure of the prima facie
ADA case, if presence is an essential function and the plaintiffs
disability precludes her from "performing" this function, there is no
need for further factfinding. Courts have used this method of
reasoning to eliminate unsympathetic plaintiffs from the protection of
both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. 7
As a result, the cases are generally devoid of concrete factors that
explain when accommodating disability-related absenteeism would
impose undue hardship on an employer.8" Common bases for finding
undue hardship range from the simplistic to the nonexistent-from
naked assertions such as "it is obvious why the plaintiff cannot come
and go as he pleases""9 to no discussion whatsoever of undue hard-
ship.9" This lack of guidance as to the line between reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship has been criticized by commenta-
84. 859 F. Supp. 498 (D. Kan. 1994).
85. Id. at 505.
86. Id. at 508.
87. See, e.g., Lemere v. Burnley, 683 F. Supp. 275 (D.D.C. 1988).
88. E.g., Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 309 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd, 956 F.2d 1163
(4th Cir. 1992); Santiago v. Temple Univ., 739 F. Supp. 974, 979 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affd, 928
F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1991); Matzo v. Postmaster Gen., 685 F. Supp. 260, 263 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd,
861 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
89. Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481, 485 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), affd, 831 F.2d 298 (6th
Cir. 1987).
90. See Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994).
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tors as creating "unnecessary indeterminacy which disserves employers
and the disabled alike."91 It is perhaps a weakness of the legislation
itself that it does not require a quantitative basis for undue hardship;
it requires only that the accommodation be "an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense."92  Yet, in order to remain true to
the spirit of the legislation, courts should be more stringent in
requiring employers to delineate the factors that constitute undue
hardship ."
Perhaps one of the reasons courts have not been sufficiently
stringent is that quantifying the cost of accommodating disability-
related absenteeism may be trickier and less precise than, for example,
quantifying the cost of renovating a work station. Nevertheless, if one
follows the guidelines provided by the ADA's interpretive regulations,
this task should not be unduly burdensome.
C. The Disabled Person, Not Absenteeism, Must Be Accommodated
The "presence is an essential function" myth assumes that the
absenteeism itself must be accommodated. For example, in Santiago
v. Temple University,94 the court held that
an employee of any status, full or part time, cannot be qualified for
his position if he is unable to attend the workplace to perform the
required duties, because attendance is necessarily the fundamental
prerequisite to job qualification. "The law does not protect
absenteeism or employees who take excessive leave and are unable
to perform the prerequisites of their job."9
Although it is true that the law does not protect absenteeism, the law
is supposed to protect the disabled. Yet in this decision, absenteeism
is treated as outside the scope of anything that would need to be
accommodated. "Plaintiff cannot be accommodated for excessive
absenteeism. Where a [disability] cannot be accommodated, plaintiff
is not otherwise qualified."96
In truth, it is the disabled individual who must be accommodated,
not absenteeism. Even in cases where the essential functions of a job
can only be performed at specific locations at specific times, this focus
91. R. Bales, Libertarianism, Environmentalism, and Utilitarianism: An Examination of
Theoretical Frameworks for Enforcing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 1993 DET. C.L.
REV. 1163, 1167.
92. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(10)(A) (West 1994).
93. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
94. 739 F. Supp. 974 (E.D. Pa. 1990), afftd, 928 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1991).
95. Id. at 979 (quoting Stevens v. Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409, 1415 (N.D. Ga. 1983)).
96. Id.
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on locations and times is not the determinative focus under the ADA.
In the words of one court:
[F]or a person with a vocationally relevant disability, such as chronic
bronchitis which causes absences from work, determining whether
an employer's actions constitute discrimination violative of the ADA
involves looking both to whether the person can perform the
essential functions of the job and to whether a reasonable accommo-
dation can be made that would permit the employee to do so.97
One difficulty the courts are having, which becomes apparent
upon a review of the case law, is determining the level of accommo-
dation that is required. This was the question left unanswered by
Arline. The failure to fully consider the reasonable accommodation
question appears to be a holdover from the pre-Arline days when
courts apparently assumed that equal treatment was all that was
required under disability rights legislation. However,
the theory of equal treatment presumes that employers can use
neutral job-selection criteria that will accurately measure a potential
worker's ability to perform the job in question. In this regard
disability discrimination poses a problem, because seemingly neutral
criteria often reflect an unstated norm that effectively excludes
people with disabilities."
The ADA acknowledges the fact that seemingly neutral criteria
may reflect an unstated norm that effectively excludes people with
disabilities. One form of discrimination under the ADA is "utilizing
standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of
discrimination on the basis of disability."99  Under this language, a
disabled employee is a victim of discrimination when she is fired
because her disability precludes her from adhering to the same
attendance requirements as apply to non-disabled employees. Further,
this language implicitly mandates an inquiry into whether or not a
reasonable accommodation exists for an employee's inability to meet
those attendance requirements. At least one court held "accommoda-
tion" to mean that "[t]he employer must be willing to consider making
changes in its ordinary work rules, facilities, terms, and conditions in
order to enable a disabled individual to work."1 °
97. Hall v. Janet Wattles Ctr., No. 94-C-50239, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5801, at *10 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 14, 1995) (emphasis added).
98. Murphy, supra note 3, at 1613.
99. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (West 1994) (emphasis added).
100. Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995).
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D. Persons With Disability-Related Absenteeism
Can Be Accommodated
The "presence is an essential function myth" belies the fact that
persons with disability-related absenteeism can be accommodated. In
many cases, courts have made conclusory statements such as "it is
elemental that one who does not come to work cannot perform any of
his job functions, essential or otherwise." '' Although at first glance
it seems axiomatic that presence would be an essential function of
many jobs, and it is an arguable prerequisite to some, absenteeism is
a fact of business life.
Some level of absenteeism is regularly tolerated by employers.
Many, if not most, American organizations already provide for
workers' absenteeism by overstaffing.102 For example, most employ-
ers provide maternity leave, jury duty leave, disability leave, and other
types of unpredictable or long-term leave, either with or without pay,
on a regular basis. If presence were truly an essential function, none
of these types of leave could be available. Furthermore, many other
types of accommodations are available, such as flex-time, job sharing,
at-home work, telecommuting, and part-time work.
IV. THE APPROPRIATE APPROACH
A. Focus on Technical Skills During the
"Qualified Individual" Inquiry
Courts should discard the idea that presence is an essential
function and confine their inquiry to technical skills when determining
whether a plaintiff is a "qualified individual." Significantly, the
legislative history of the ADA does not mention attendance in its
discussions of job qualifications. Instead, those discussions focus on
necessary technical skills, such as typing speed.0 3 Moreover, the
legislative history specifically mentions the granting of additional
unpaid leave as a possible accommodation."°4
Thus, there is virtually no authority for disqualifying a disabled
individual on the basis of attendance requirements. Instead, the
legislation inherently requires a court to focus only on technical skills
101. Wimbley, 642 F. Supp. at 485.
102. Stephen M. Crow, Excessive Absenteeism and the Disabilities Act, 48 ARB. J. 65 (1993).
103. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 348.
104. Id. at 63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345.
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during the "qualified individual" phase of the ADA inquiry. Once the
plaintiff has shown that he possesses the requisite skills for the job, the
court can then inquire into whether any accommodation is required by
the employer and, if so, whether that accommodation would impose an
undue hardship.
In essence, this approach is nothing more than the case-by-case
analysis that is mandated by the ADA. "[P]erfect attendance is not a
necessary element of all jobs .... [T]he necessary level of attendance
and regularity is a question of degree depending on the circumstances
of each position."' 0' Furthermore, "the degree of [necessary atten-
dance] ... requires close scrutiny.. . . What is material is that the job
gets done .... This is necessarily a fact intensive determination. '"106
B. Acknowledge Accommodations Available to the Employee With
Disability-Related Absenteeism Problems
Reasonable accommodations for individuals with disability-related
absenteeism abound. Examples of such accommodations include flex-
time, job sharing, at-home work, telecommuting, part-time work,
vacation time or leave without pay, advance sick leave, and allowing
the employee to work weekends or other scheduled days off to make
up the time. If the nature of the work does not permit any of the
above options, the employer may be able to arrange a transfer to
another, more flexible position. In cases where no reasonable
accommodation exists within the disabled person's line of work,
vocational rehabilitation counseling can be made available." 7 In this
way, the disabled employee may be retrained for a more flexible line
of work.
Telecommuting, in particular, has been found to have significant
benefits for employers, employees, and society. Contrary to the myth
that working at home results in a substantial reduction in productivity
and quality,108 most companies that have experimented with telecom-
muting and other work-at-home arrangements have found exactly the
opposite."°  For example, Pacific Bell, Sears & Roebuck, Hewlett
105. Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 309-10 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd. 956 F.2d 1163
(4th Cir. 1992).
106. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigation, Ltd., 820 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 (N.D. Il1. 1993).
107. In the United States, each state is required by law to have a public agency that is
responsible for providing vocational rehabilitation services. The federal government provides
financial support for those services. RESOURCES FOR REHABILITATION, INC., MEETING THE
NEEDS OF EMPLOYEES WITH DISABILITIES 6-7 (1991).
108. Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544-45 (7th Cir. 1995).
109. See, e.g., JACK M. NILLE, MAKING TELECOMMUTING HAPPEN 10 (1994); PHILLIP
E. MAHFOOD, HOME WORK: HOW TO HIRE, MANAGE & MONITOR EMPLOYEES WHO
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Packard, and Aetna Casualty are among the companies currently taking
advantage of the benefits of telecommuting.'10 Hence, courts should
not be so quick to dismiss work-at-home solutions from a list of
reasonable accommodations. 1
C. Require Quantification of Undue Hardship Claims
Finally, courts should not allow employers to circumvent the
undue hardship analysis by simply making a conclusive statement that
they cannot reasonably accommodate absenteeism. Often, by the time
these cases reach the court, the employer has already been accommo-
dating the employee's disability for some time. In these circumstances,
plaintiffs can argue that if this accommodation has been taking place,
it must be reasonable.' 2 Therefore, the employer should document,
to the extent practicable, factors such as financial loss, disruption of the
work environment, specific instances of loss of business or productivi-
ty, and morale problems that would be caused by continuing to
accommodate the disabled employee's absenteeism. Although the
courts are not required to weigh the factors listed in the statute and the
EEOC regulations, future litigants would benefit from such an
analysis. Stating a prima facie case would be facilitated for plaintiffs,
and ultimately, employers would also benefit by being able to predict
with some certainty what evidence will suffice to show undue hardship
and successfully defend an ADA claim.
Although it is possible, and perhaps probable, that many of the
cases discussed in this Comment would have yielded the same results
under this alternative analysis, the potential to predict outcomes and
thus encourage out-of-court settlements would be beneficial to all
concerned.
WORK AT HOME 8-15 (1992); MEG HAFER, TELECOMMUTING: AN ALTERNATE ROUTE TO
WORK §§ 1-1 to 1-9 (1992). Although telecommuting may not be a viable alternative for every
disabled employee, the realities of today's workplace are making this option more feasible and
beneficial than ever before. See NILLES, supra, at 1-6.
110. See HAFER, supra note 109, at 1-5 to 1-9.
111. The District of Columbia Circuit agrees. See Langon v. Department of Health &
Human Serv., 959 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1992); cf Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544 (holding that,
while an employer is not required to allow disabled workers to work at home, an accommodation
that allows a disabled worker to work at home, at full pay, subject to a slight loss of sick leave,
is reasonable as a matter of law).
112. See Laura Hartman, Note, The Disabled Employee and Reasonable Accommodation Under
the Minnesota Human Rights Act: Where Does Absenteeism Attributable To the Disability Fit Into
the Law?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 905, 925 (1993).
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V. CONCLUSION
A rule that precludes an entire class of disabled individuals is
antithetical to a statute whose stated purpose is to assure the disabled"equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency." '113 However, the "presence is an essential
function" myth precludes ADA coverage for an entire class of disabled
individuals-those whose disabilities make it impossible for them to
adhere to a regular work schedule. If presence is an essential function,
then virtually any level of absenteeism would deprive a disabled
individual from the protection of the ADA.
According to a recent EEOC analysis of ADA claims, the law
seems to be missing its targeted group." 4 Experts say many disabled
people do not know how the ADA can be used to gain work."' Yet
even where disabled people understand the ADA, the "presence is an
essential function" rule will discourage many from seeking work or
from fighting discriminatory practices where they occur. As a result,
highly qualified people whose disabilities could probably be accommo-
dated may be discouraged from working. When disabled people do
not work, there is a tremendous cost to society, not only in the obvious
drain on public funds, but also in human costs, such as loss of dignity,
self-sufficiency, and a sense of purpose. This loss is senseless in light
of the overwhelming evidence that disabled workers are often highly
qualified and motivated." 6
By perpetuating the "presence is an essential function" line of
reasoning, courts are ignoring the fact that the chronically ill were
intended to be covered by the ADA. Sporadic, unpredictable, and
sometimes lengthy absences are the natural result of many chronic
illnesses. Does this mean that the chronically ill can never be
accommodated? By perpetuating the myth that presence is an essential
function, courts seem to be saying "No-individuals with disability-
related absenteeism will not be protected by the ADA." At the very
least, there are no clear guidelines for predicting the outcome of
113. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(8) (West 1994).
114. Jay Matthews, Disabilities Law Appears To Be Missing Targeted Group, THE NEWS
TRIB. (Tacoma), Apr. 16, 1995, at A8.
115. Id.
116. For example, productivity at Carolina Fine Snacks increased to 90% after the hiring of
several disabled individuals through a local vocational rehabilitation center. Small Business and
the Americans With Disabilities Act (CNN television broadcast, July 30, 1994) available in
Westlaw, ALLNEWS, 1994 WL 3825086.
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litigation on this issue.117 In order to alleviate the incongruous
results reached in the past, courts must discard the idea that presence
is an essential function and focus on whether the disability can be
reasonably accommodated.
Although employers clearly have an interest in having productive
employees, the plain language of the ADA requires employers to
modify policies based on able-bodied norms to accommodate the
disabled. Furthermore, absenteeism can be, and is, accommodated all
the time. Finally, in the litigation context, employers can and should
be required, as far as is practicable, to quantify undue hardship.
If the ADA is to live up to its mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities rather than evolving
into a mere token, courts must take responsibility for applying its
provisions in a manner that remains true to the spirit in which the
legislation was created. In a political climate that has become
increasingly hostile to any measure perceived as special treatment for
discrete groups, courts may be the only institutions capable of
enforcing the mandate against discrimination. Consequently, courts,
like employers, have an affirmative duty to accommodate chronically
ill employees by setting aside preconceived notions and allowing
plaintiffs the opportunity for full and fair consideration of their claims.
117. The ability to predict the outcome of litigation in ADA cases may become even more
critical given the backlog of discrimination cases the EEOC currently faces. This backlog means
that plaintiffs will increasingly seek private lawyers to pursue complaints. Peter T. Kilborn,
EEOC Struggles to Trim Backlog, Bureaucracy, THE NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma), Nov. 26, 1994, at
Al.
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